Quantitative historical social research: the German experience (1987) by Best, Heinrich & Schröder, Wilhelm Heinz
www.ssoar.info
Quantitative historical social research: the German
experience (1987)
Best, Heinrich; Schröder, Wilhelm Heinz
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Best, H., & Schröder, W. H. (2006). Quantitative historical social research: the German experience (1987). Historical
Social Research, Supplement, 18, 120-135. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-288204
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
 120
Quantitative Historical Social Research. The German  
Experience (1987)∗ 
Heinrich Best, Wilhelm Heinz Schröder 
I. Quantitative Methods in History: Between Methodological 
Rigorism and Pragmatism 
At the German Historians’ Congress in Mannheim in 1976, Jürgen Kocka warned: 
“In this country ... we tend to criticize a thing before it really exists.1” This state-
ment anticipated the controversy, the spread of quantification was expected to raise 
in the Federal Republic of Germany. Two issues were at stake: what is history, and 
what criteria are there for truth in history? Jürgen Kocka’s prognosis, shared by 
many, seemed to be well-founded. In the United States ten years earlier, quantifica-
tion had arisen in explicit and definite Opposition to “traditional” historiography 
and its proponents had claimed that history could only be considered scientific 
when based on numerical evidence and formalized methods. At about the same 
time, Arthur Schlesinger, the most prominent representative of the “traditionalists” 
formulated his famous verdict on quantification: All significant questions were sig-
nificant precisely because they defied quantitative answers2. When quantitative 
methods became an issue in the Federal Republic of Germany, the debate in the 
United States had already become heated3. It only seemed natural that the contro-
versy on quantification would be imported into the Federal Republic along with the 
method itself. The spread of quantitative methods was nevertheless inconspicuous 
and uncontroversial. The reasons for this “German Sonderweg to quantification” 
can only briefly outlined in this essay. It was specially important that just at this 
time the sociological debate on methodology which had examined the concept of 
experience maintained by the social sciences had died down. 
Since this discussion also dealt with the value of analytical and hermeneutic 
methods for epistemology, the American quantification controversy seemed to offer 
                                                             
∗  Reprint from: HSF Vol. 21 (1987), pp. 30-48. 
1  Jürgen Kocka, “Quantifizierung in der Geschichtswissenschaft,” in: Heinrich Best and 
Reinhard Mann, eds., Quantitative Methoden in der historisch-sozialwissenschaftlichen 
Forschung (Stuttgart, 1977), p. 4. 
2  A good survey of the American debate is Allan G. Bogue, Clio and the Bitch Goddess. 
Quantification in American Political History (Beverly Hills et al 1983); cf. also Robert W. 
Fogel, “ Scientific and Traditional History” in: L.J. Cohen et al., eds.,Logic, Methodology 
and Philosophy of Science (Amsterdam, 1982); J. Morgan Kousser, “Quantitative Social 
Scientific History,” in: H. Kammen, ed., The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical 
Writing in the United States (Ithaca, 1980), pp. 433 -456. Arthur Schlesinger’s statement is 
quoted in C.V. Woodward, “History and the Third Culture,” in: Journal of Contemporary 
History 3 (1968), p. 29. 
3  Some of the most important contributions are to be found in an anthology, published re-
peatedly since the middle of the 1960’s: Ernst Topitsch, ed., Logik der Sozialwissen-
schaften (Königstein /Ts., 1984). 
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nothing new to a German public concerned with methodological problems, except 
possibly for a blatant scientism seldom seen here. 
Another explanation for this Sonderweg is that the discussion in German histori-
ography in the 1960s and early 1970s showed little interest in the methodological 
foundations of history, but rather centered on the selection and interpretation of 
concrete historical topics. An example of this orientation is the controversy on the 
German power-elite’s responsibility for the outbreak of World War I. When set 
against this passionate debate on the reinterpretation of German history, quantifica-
tion seemed an esoteric methodological innovation that could not readily be associ-
ated with any particular political camp or historiographical school. Quantification 
was put to very disparate use: as a means to help perfect positivist fact-collecting 
and fact-processing4: as a method of letting the “silent masses” speak5; or even as 
part of the methodological canon of Marxist historiography6. Out of fear that they 
might be banished into the esoteric realm of “pure” specialization, the early pro-
tagonists of quantification consciously avoided methodological rigorism. The com-
position of the membership of the advisory council for the “Association for Quanti-
fication and Methods in Historical and Social Research” (QUANTUM), founded in 
1975, demonstrates that a pluralism in political and scientific orientation stood at 
the cradle of German quantitative historical research7. 
This pluralism did not mean there were no differences of opinion or program-
matical controversies. But the use of quantitative methods must really be seen in the 
context of a more general historiographical development: The field of research 
which viewed itself as a “history of society” (in the broadest sense of term) was 
morning towards the research logic and methodological standards of the systematic 
social sciences8. The keyterms structuring the different stages of this development 
are—in order of their introduction—social history, structural history, historical so-
cial science, and historical social research. In this context, historical social re-
search represents a methodological paradigm, meaning more than quantification in 
the sense of an auxiliary science. 
At the beginning of this development, stood social history defined by Werner 
Conze as “history of society, more explicitly, of social structures, sequences of 
events, movements9.” However, this global definition does not make clear the dis-
tinction between social history and the other approaches which we will be discuss-
ing. One distinguishing feature of social history is the subject tackled: traditionally, 
the field of social history is society without politics or, as George M. Trevelyan put 
                                                             
4  Cf. for instance, Carl August Lückerath, “Prolegomena zur elektronischen Datenverarbei-
tung im Bereich der Geschichtswissenschaft,“ in: Historische Zeitschrift 207 (1968), pp. 
265-296. 
5  Cf. Richard Tilly, “Sozialer Protest als Gegenstand historischer Forschung,” in: H.R. Tilly, 
Kapital, Staat und Protest in der deutschen Industrialisierung (Göttingen, 1980), p. 175. 
6  For a comprehensive treatment See Don Karl Rowney, ed., Soviet Quantitative History 
(Beverly Hills, 1984). 
7  Cf. Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung 17 (1981), p. 96f. 
8  Cf. Heinrich Best, “Histoire sociale et méthodes quantitatives en Allemagne Fédérale,” in: 
Histoire moderne et contemporaine informatique 7 (1985), pp. 3-28. 
9  Werner Conze , “Sozialgeschichte,” in: Hans-Ulrich Wehler, ed., Moderne deutsche Sozial-
geschichte, 3rd ed. (Köln/Berlin, 1979), p. 19. 
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it, “the history of a people with the politics left out10.” The second differentiating 
feature lies in the method and the criteria of truth applied. Near the end of the 
1960’s Werner Conze could still claim: “The methods of social history are charac-
terized by the methods—generally valid in history—of historical source criticism 
and that of ‘understanding’ history11.” But in fact, both aspects were at this time in 
the process of further development. This made itself most strongly felt in the broad-
ening of the topics deemed valid for social history. Werner Conze emphasized that 
social history was as much “political history” as the history of events and deci-
sions12. With reference to Otto Brunner, Hans Mommsen similarly characterized 
social history as a “general view” intent on the “inner construction, the structure of 
human organizations13.” 
“Structure” became the key term in the next discussion. The concept of “histoire 
des structures” (i. e. history of structure, structuralist history) proposed by Fernand 
Braudel and elaborated in many articles published by the French journal, Annales, 
was an attempt to reconstruct the historical “relationships” and “conditions” of su-
pra-individual developments and processes without explicitly concentrating on cer-
tain areas of historical reality. Nonetheless, the political system was generally ex-
cluded de facto14. Often associated with this approach, was the demand for an 
understanding of the total historical process in its synchronic and diachronic con-
text. But in the attempts at a “histoire totale”, a comprehensive history of econom-
ics, society, politics and culture (large-scale in space and time), the specific weak-
nesses of “structuralist history” became apparent. Upholding a “sharp demarcation 
between structures and nonstructures (events, decisions and actions) in history is 
theoretically and practically very difficult and problematical15.” Another weakness 
of the structuralist approach was the arbitrary way the facts were “assembled” into 
integral large-scale histories. Indeed, structural history had no substantial theory 
that would facilitate the selection of relevant facts, no hypotheses at its disposal on 
the interdependence between economics, politics and other areas of reality, nor was 
it able to formulate provable hypotheses that would identify the causal and func-
tional relationships between the individual aspects of the historical reality studied 
and the important factors of changes16. Polemical criticisms sometimes termed this 
approach, the “sandwhich-method” or “deskdrawer history.” Brilliant descriptions 
of great literary quality were occasionally the result, but consistent and far-reaching 
explanations remained rare. 
In this point the programm of historical social science went further than struc-
turalist history: “The growing insight into the often cited ‘theoretical poverty’ of 
                                                             
10  George M. Treve1yan, Illustrated English Social History (New York, 1962) (first publ. 
1944), p. XI. 
11  Conze, Sozialgeschichte, p. 25. 
12  Ibid., p. 24. 
13  Hans Mommsen, “Sozialgeschichte,” in: Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte, p. 34. 
14  Jürgen Kocka, Sozialgeschichte. Begriff – Entwicklung – Probleme (Göttingen, 1977), p. 
70 f.; Michael Erbe, Zur neueren französischen Sozialgeschichtsforschung. Die Gruppe um 
die “Annales” (Darmstadt, 1979). For the German reception see especially the introduction, 
p. 27 ff. 
15  Kocka, Sozialgeschichte, p. 73. 
16  Ibid., p. 79. 
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history played a major role in the development of historical social science 17.” Re-
ferring almost exclusively to the theoretical advances of the systematic social sci-
ences, this claim usually means that sociological terms, categories and models are 
fitted into historical argumentation. But less stringent demands are placed on the 
scope and explanatory force of theoretical statements: historical social science is 
concerned with “changes in a historical period under the specific conditions of that 
period18” and not with supra-historical theoretical laws. The theoretical statements 
of historical social science are primarily “ad-hoc theories”, i. e. “hypotheses, used 
exclusively to transform present (restricted) regularities into a complex of theoreti-
cal statements neither integrated into a broader context, nor applied in their valid 
range to other areas or periods19.” 
Though some representatives of historical social science claim to formulate 
“mid-range theories”, this practice actually violates the given range of such proposi-
tional systems. 
In order to broaden an ad-hoc theory into a mid-range theory, the series of invari-
ables and regularities covered must be confronted with similar invariables differing 
in space and time. This will either lead to a unified mid-range theory or to a typo-
logical differentiation ..., in which case the development of a theory on a higher 
level of abstraction will become necessary to cover and explain the different types 
equally well20. 
The proponents of historical social science, however, would reject this procedure 
as “unhistorical.” Even though it would be desirable for historical social science to 
define its demands on theory more clearly, the use of ad-hoc theories is legitimate 
and fruitful. Empirical social research also makes use of such propositions whose 
range is limited to the particular problem discussed. A more problematic aspect of 
historical social science research is the use of individual sociological terms and 
categories out of their theoretical context; another difficulty is the use of theory in 
which “explanations” are later “transposed” onto the evidence. This inductive pro-
cedure leads to arbitrariness. The “results” observed can be “explained” by a theo-
retically infinite number of “causes”. It is impossible to form a logical chain from 
observation to theoretical propositions21. 
The methodological practice of historical social science is subject to severe criti-
cism too. Though the representatives of historical social science demand a fusion of 
“historical-hermeneutic” and “analytical-social scientific” methods, historical social 
science, in practice, rarely goes beyond hermeneutics, rarely resorting to quantita-
tive methods even for illustrative purposes. However, descriptive casuistry does not 
                                                             
17  Reinhard Rürup, “Zur Einführung,” in: Rürup, ed., Historische Sozialwissenschaft (Göttin-
gen, 1977), p. 8. 
18  Ibid.; cf. also Winfried Schulze, Soziologie und Geschichtswissenschaft. Einführung in die 
Probleme der Kooperation beider Wissenschaften (München, 1974), p. 188. 
19  René König, “Grundlagenprobleme der modernen soziologischen Forschungsmethoden 
(Modelle, Theorien, Kategorien),” in: Sozialwissenschaft und Gesellschaftsgestaltung—
Festschrift für Gerhard Weisser (Berlin, 1963), p. 26. 
20  Ibid., p. 30. 
21  Heine von Alemann, Der Forschungsprozeß. Eine Einführung in die Praxis der empirischen 
Sozialforschung (Stuttgart, 1977), p. 25. 
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suffice for testing theories, since it leads to discrepancies between the proposed 
range and empirical proof of theoretical propositions on past society. 
In this regard historical social research is a further development of historical so-
cial science. Generally speaking, historical social research can be defined as “theo-
retically motivated research into societies, past and present, with valid methods—
valid, in the sense that the scope of the research operations fit the scope of the theo-
retical propositions22.” In our case, it may be defined as “empirical, especially 
quantitative, research on social structure and processes in history, considered theo-
retically and methodically23.” This approach is neither “neo-positivist”, since it is 
theoretically based, nor can it be simply viewed as a historical application of em-
pirical social research, since the particulars of historical data and the demands 
placed on theories able to deal with historical facts differ in many respects from a 
contemporary sociology. The relationship between empirical and historical social 
research may be characterized by saying that the methodological standards of em-
pirical social research (though not necessarily the methods themselves) have gained 
acceptance in historical social research. Since historical social research deals with 
collective phenomena, the acceptance of these standards implies the use of quantita-
tive methods. In contrast to the traditional use of statistics in social history, histori-
cal social research transforms qualitative information into numerical data which is 
then turned over, to mathematical calculation, quantitative evidence is not used just 
as an illustrative, but to test hypotheses. 
II. Theory—Research Tool and Epistemological Goal in  
Quantitative Historical Social Research 
The theoretical component in the definition of historical social research is based on 
two presuppositions that need further clarification. Historical social research is 
guided by a research strategy led by theoretical suppositions and aims at confirma-
tion of the most general hypotheses possible. A brief look at the practice of quanti-
tative historical research demonstrates that the first presupposition mentioned above 
is in no way self-evident. Quantification is not necessarily associated with concep-
tualization and theoretical orientation. Many users see quantification and data-
processing as further developments of the fundamental procedures used in tradi-
tional historical research, with the old historiographical aim of putting all available 
sources and interpretative methods to use in order to win the most detailed, com-
plete and objective knowledge of the past possible. In this respect, the computer is a 
tool for reconstructing past reality “like it really was”. Behind this view, there is a 
methodological supposition rarely made explicit: historical events, processes, and 
persons may best be understood by considering all the sources deemed relevant. A 
characteristic expression of this view can be found in the early discussion on data-
                                                             
22  Heinrich Best, “Quantifizierende Historische Sozialforschung in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland. Ein Überblick,” in: Geschichte in Köln 9 (1981), p. 147. 
23  Wilhelm H. Schröder, “Kollektive Biographien in der historischen Sozialforschung,” in: 
Schröder, ed., Lebenslauf und Gesellschaft (Stuttgart, 1985), p. 8. 
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processing in German publications. Data-processing was viewed as an auxiliary 
tool necessary only for expanding history’s capacity for mass sources24. 
It soon became apparent, however, that the great capacities and flexibility of 
electronic data-processing were changing the direction of research in a way many 
neither desired nor expected: the choice of a data base with adequate indicator 
qualities, the necessity of sometimes rigid classification of material before data-
processing, and, finally, the selection of appropriate methods of statistical analysis 
made it necessary to begin research with an adequate conceptualization of the his-
torical processes and phenomena observed. Relinquishing theory would immedi-
ately reduce the quality of the research undertaken: the facts collected cannot—in 
and of themselves—reveal the criteria that would make possible the appropriate 
selection, classification and combination of those same facts. The postulate of a 
theory-free fact base contradicts important pre-suppositions of quantification; or put 
in other terms, “there can be no measurement without theory”25. 
Quantitative research therefore must begin with theoretical reflection. Not only 
does this requirement apply to the high-level testing of hypotheses, but also to the 
“simple” descriptive presentation of empirical data. Since no description is able to 
reflect reality in all its complexity, it must confine itself to a particular segment. 
The decision as to which part of reality should be examined or which characteristics 
are relevant for analysis and should therefore be surveyed, can only be made on the 
basis of theoretical criteria; which only then dictate further steps, such as the type 
and manner of source selection, collection of data, etc. This fundamental and logi-
cal priority of explicit theoretical consideration does not mean, as far as everyday 
research work is concerned, that the researcher—completely independent of the 
concrete context of his research is chiefly concerned with some “pure” development 
of theory; but, rather, that he will naturally consider the conditions for research 
(availability of primary and secondary sources, methods, techniques, etc.) in the 
process of developing theory, in order to guarantee the success of his research. 
In this respect, the traditional process of historical research is reversed. Instead 
of being the hesitantly pursued and rarely attained culmination of positivist fact-
gathering, theory becomes the starting point for the epistemological process. Instead 
of making hypotheses and normative propositions on the basis of Observation, theo-
retical propositions are confronted with reality. Put in ideal-typical terms, the meta-
theoretical model of induction is replaced by a deductive one—an unexpected dy-
namic of a technology often indiscriminately applied. This has put some users in the 
thankless position of the “sorcerer’s apprentice”, unable to contain the magical 
forces he had brought to life. 
Another underlying meta-theoretical presupposition is a consequence of the 
maxim that the goal of the epistemological process in historical social research is to 
formulate the most general theoretical propositions possible. But even this assump-
tion is neither obvious nor undisputed. Many historians still uphold the view that it 
is not possible to speak of laws in the same sense that one can in the natural sci-
                                                             
24  Cf. et al. Rolf Gundlach and Carl August Lückerath, Historische Wissenschaften und elek-
tronische Datenverarbeitung (Frankfurt on the Main, 1976); cf. also Lückerath, Prolegom-
ena. 
25  Michael Drake and Peter Hammerton, Exercises in Historical Sociology (Walton Hall, 
1974), p. 12. 
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ences. This stance is based on the proposition that human activity and, in this sense, 
all historical phenomena, are symbolic in character and are the result of human in-
tention26. 
At the beginning of the 19th century, the German philosopher Windelband dis-
tinguished between die two opposing metatheoretical positions considered here. His 
definition of nomothetic and ideographic scientific thinking is still significant for 
the contemporary discussion on the philosophy of science27. Windelband saw the 
natural sciences as being characterized by nomotheticism and the cultural sciences 
(Geisteswissenschaften)—or more generally, “human sciences”—by ideographism; 
but the social sciences were increasingly guided by natural science’s concept of ex-
perience. Today, laws of the type represented by “Newton’s Law” are the epistemo-
logical goal of a portion of sociology. This development was the maxim of the 
“unity of the empirical sciences”, most prominently represented by Hempel and 
Popper. If science aims at the truth, and truth is undivided, then there must be a uni-
fied approach capable of perceiving this truth. The goal of the epistemological 
process cannot, therefore, be reduced to the development and application of theo-
retical concepts and structure types (to which many traditional historians would 
consent); the epistemological process must aim at the formulation and investigation 
of covering laws, understood here as “strictly universal, physically necessary (i. e. 
nomological) assertion on stable relationships of at least two classes of events28.” 
Does that historical research which claims to be non-theoretical, actually lack 
theory? The argument is certainly justified that even a narrative and associative his-
tory is implicitly or latently theoretical. This is true in, at least, two respects: It is 
assumed that the facts considered are relevant (principle of relevancy); upon closer 
inspectation the narrative itself reveals itself to be a chain of assumed causalities, a 
web of relationships. This fact is occasionally characterized in the discussion as the 
“paradigm of historical sequence.” Theoretical assumptions, in the broadest sense, 
lay the foundations for this paradigm. In the most general sense, these may be on 
the categorial level: e. g. “determinism”, “causality”, “accident”, and “freedom”; 
they may involve descriptions of the motor force attributed to particular agents and 
agencies in history, e. g. ideas, great men, divine guidance, moral forces, climate, 
geography, social and economic conditions; and theoretical assumptions may also 
be seen in the categories dealing with the course of historical processes: e. g., “irre-
versibility of development”, “repetition”, “progress”, and those inherent in histori-
cal stages theories. Usually, these paradigms are not made explicit in the formula-
tion of historical relationships; nonetheless, they are present and play a structuring 
                                                             
26  Peter Christian Ludz and Hans-Dieter Rönsch, “Theoretische Probleme empirischer 
Geschichtsforschung,” in: Theodor Schieder and Kurt Gräubig, ed., Theorieprobleme der 
Geschichtswissenschaft (Darmstadt, 1977), p. 63; exemplary for the state of the general 
discussion on theory in German historiography are the earlier four volumes in the series, 
Theorie der Geschichte. 
27  W. Windelband, Präludien, Aufsätze und Reden zur Einführung in die Philosophie, 4th rev., 
vol. 2 (Tübingen, 1911), p. 145. 
28  Bernhard Giesen and Michael Schmid, “Erklärungsprobleme in den Sozialwissenschaften,” 
in: Giesen/Schmid, ed., Theorie, Handeln und Geschichte (Hamburg, 1975), p. 14. 
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role in the historian’s portrayal of events and his presentation of the evidence for 
relationships29. 
The distinction between theoretically oriented historical research and narrative 
historiography lies, therefore, in the different degree of explicitness of the hypothe-
ses and normative propositions utilized. If we assume (as most do) that every type 
of research should attempt to reconstruct the epistemological process as far as pos-
sible and, thus, be open for criticism (intersubjectivity), then explicitly theoretical 
historical research must be preferred. 
Further criticism of the theoretization of historical research is based on a differ-
ent view of the epistemological goal of history. It is argued that the historian’s task 
is to understand historical facts, but not to give causal explanations. The hermeneu-
tic modus of experience is made obligatory for history30”. History should, therefore, 
describe various aspects of culture, but not formulate covering laws. Though seen 
from a different angle this view returns to the contrast between ideographic and 
nomological method as defined by Windelband. One might object that this distinc-
tion was not, as many philosophers of science seemed to suppose, that important for 
theoretically oriented social research. One example is Max Weber’s classical defini-
tion of sociology as a science “which understands and interprets social action, and 
in so doing attempts to explain its course and effects31.” Even in a sociology which 
views itself as a rule-bound science, the researcher is only capable of comprehend-
ing the information inherent in his material when he knows the system of linguistic 
signs, the symbolic language in which his material has been written. “It, therefore, 
plays no great role—as far as epistemological theory is concerned—whether this 
information is directly perceived through immediate social contact (as in inter-
views), or indirectly, through historical documents32.” The fact that both sociology 
and history are tied to the hermeneutic modus of experience must not necessarily 
contradict their theoretical orientation. To put it differently: the question, “what 
happened in the past?” is intrinsincally bound to the question, “why did it happen?” 
Theoretically oriented quantitative history is often also criticized because of the 
defects and difficulties in the transmission of historical data. Historical data are “in-
advertent” data, i. e. they are usually neither gathered nor transmitted under schol-
arly auspices, and even if scientists were involved in the production of contempo-
rary data, they were interested in particular aspects not necessarily of interest to 
future researchers. Historical data are, in this sense, the by-products of economic, 
social and cultural processes. Neither their production nor their transmission are 
usually scientifically controlled. At best, retrospective interviews are an exception 
to this, although they do suffer from other flaws. 
Seen in this light, some observers have asked whether historical social research 
could ever be anything more than a “tincture of empirical evidence combined with 
bits of useful theory and mixed with large elements of impression, surmise and em-
                                                             
29  Ibid., p. 11. 
30  Peter Christian Ludz, “Soziologie und Sozialgeschichte: Aspekte und Probleme,” in: Ludz, 
ed. “Soziologie und Sozialgeschichte,” in: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsy-
chologie, special issue 16 (Opladen, 1972), p. 16. 
31  Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, (Studienausgabe) (Tübingen, 1972), p. 1. 
32  P.Ch. Ludz, “Aspekte“, p. 16. 
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pathetic understanding33.” One may object to this verdict, however, on the grounds 
that contemporary sociology is making increasing use of data, whose production is 
hardly scientifically controlled either. An example of this are the so called process-
produced data, i. e. the internal records of public and private organzations not gath-
ered for scientific use34. The same is true of documents and texts that are the data-
base for computer-supported content analysis35. For this material, empirical social 
research developed and is still developing systematic theories of biased recording 
which allow for a better evaluation of the data’s reliability, validity, and range. One 
can expect that this knowledge may compensate for insufficient research control 
over the process of data-collecting and transmittance. On the other hand, empirical 
social research regards its own data, especially when attained through question-
naires, with growing scepticism. As a result, contemporary empirical social re-
search is relying increasingly on “unobtrusive measure” without, however, surren-
dering its theoretical orientation. Many of today’s social scientists are becoming 
more aware that their data on society can only approximate social reality. In this 
sense, sociology has, at best, a quantitative, but not a qualitative advantage over 
history, which has always viewed its sources as incomplete and faulty. One may go 
further: even in the natural sciences it is well known that measurement procedures 
may affect the phenomena under investigation. This “uncertainty principle” resem-
bles the concept of “validity” in the social sciences. 
III. The Research Process in Quantitative Historical Social  
Research 
It should not be surprising that the course of quantitative historical social research 
generally parallels empirical social research36. Differences may be observed, how-
ever, due to the special nature of the historical social researcher’s primary-source 
material, and his relationship to the period on which he is working. For historians, 
                                                             
33  Jerome M. Clubb, “The ‘New’ Quantitative History: Social Science or Old Wine in New 
Bottles?” in: Clubb/Erwin K. Scheuch, eds., Historical Social Research. The Use of His-
torical and Process-Produced Data (Stuttgart, 1980), p. 370 f. 
34  Wolfgang Bick/Paul J. Müller, “The Nature of Process-Produced Data—Towards a Social 
Scientific Source Criticism,” in: Clubb/Scheuch, op. cit., p. 370 ff.; for a comprehensive 
treatment: Wolfgang Bick et al., ed., Sozialforschung und Verwaltungsdaten (Stuttgart, 
1984). 
35  Heinrich Best, “Analysis of Content and Context of Historical Documents—The Case of 
Petitions to the Frankfurt National Assembly 1848/49,” in: Clubb /Scheuch, op. cit., p. 244. 
36  In the meantime, an imposing number of such introductions has been published which, de-
pending on their different intentions, give special emphasis to the areas of theory, general 
methodology, specific research methods and application practice in research and education, 
cf. et al.: Jürgen Friedrichs, Methoden empirischer Sozialforschung, 12th ed. (Stuttgart, 
1984); Peter Atteslander, Methoden der empirischen Sozialforschung, 5th ed. (Berlin, 
1985); Rolf Prim/Heribert Tilmann, Grundlagen einer kritisch-rationalen Sozialwissen-
schaft, 5th ed. (Stuttgart/Heidelberg, 1983); Erwin Roth, ed., Sozialwissenschaftliche Me-
thoden (Munich, 1984); Franz Krompka, Sozialwissenschaftliche Methodologie (Pader-
born, 1984); Horst Kern, Empirische Sozialforschung (Opladen, 1980). Insofar as 
statements referring to the methods of empirical social research are made below, see the 
sources already mentioned above. 
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inquiry into the significance and condition of the source material is of greater im-
portance than for empirical social researchers who have standardized though imper-
fect fact-collecting instruments at their disposal. Whereas the latter draws on his 
personal experience for inspiration in the development of theories and criteria for 
the evaluation of evidence, the former must first attain comprehensive knowledge 
of previous societies through intense effort. Technology is no substitute for this 
work—even our electronic age has not yet developed a machine capable of generat-
ing theory or interpretations. 
The main steps in a research strategy resulting from a deductive research logic 
that are briefly outlined below should be seen as a model description of the proce-
dure predominant in quantitative research37. Inductive “feed-back” is common and 
can be combined with hermeneutic methods. 
The aim of formulating an “empirical theory” is the starting point of the histori-
cal social research strategy. This simply means that the researcher collects his hy-
potheses (questions) and assembles them in the most systematic, logical and uncon-
tradictory manner possible. Theories/hypotheses must refer to reality, so that they 
may be proved faulty when confronted with empirical observation. It is necessary to 
form theories/hypotheses at the beginning of research, since only then can decisions 
be made pertaining to the methods and instruments of research needed. 
In a second step, important prerequisites for the intersubjective examination and 
control of statements on reality (i. e. on the area to be studied) must be developed 
by formulating precise terms, and operationalizating them appropriately. The terms 
used in theoretical statements must be clearly defined before beginning the empiri-
cal investigation. Each term is accorded a series of characteristics with the help of 
semantic rules; characteristics are, in this sense, observable events and/or words, 
whose meaning is known. In order to define a term it is often necessary to analyse 
its meaning systematically or empirically. In empirical research, nominal defini-
tions are usually preferred as they are especially suited for subject-structuring; in 
nominal definitions a term already known (definiens) is substituted for the term to 
be defined (definiendum). 
Operationalization is the most important step in historical social research when 
the theoretical and empirical level are brought together. The validity and reliability 
of operationalization are decisive for the quality of scientific argumentation. Opera-
tionalization aims at linking previously defined terms needed for empirical investi-
gation of quantifiable data. Operational definitions determine the research opera-
tions which enable the researcher to decide whether or not the case investigated 
corresponds to the term defined. The concrete procedure is dependent on the rela-
tion between the empirical sphere and the term to be operationalized. In a direct 
relation, the situation described by the term can be directly observed or perceived. 
In this case, the operations of research can be immediately undertaken (information 
on what, where, when, and how the counting should be done). For terms with an 
indirect empirical relation, indicators must first be developed. Indicators, aided by 
the empirically observable, should allow those phenomena to be inferred which are 
                                                             
37  The elements mentioned in our survey are in general accordance with the study units of our 
basic curriculum: Heinrich Best/Wilhelm H. Schröder, “Basiscurriculum für eine quantita-
tive historische Sozialforschung,” in: Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialfor-
schung 17 (1981), pp. 3-50. 
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not directly observable but are, nonetheless, described by the term. These indicators 
are then also operationalized through information on the research operations neces-
sary. The validity of indicator development is highly dependent on the precision 
with which those phenomena made observable by the indicator, reflect the situation 
described by the term. Indicator development must, therefore, be substantiated by 
careful indicator analysis. 
In a third step the selection procedures and techniques for historical data must be 
determined. At this stage of research, genuinely historical methods (especially 
source criticism), as well as those of empirical social research (sampling proce-
dures) may be put to work with complementary benefit38. The historian’s usual pro-
cedure may be so summarized: he determines the historical problem area to be ex-
amined, decides on the appropriate source material, considers the availability of 
sources and then works through all the sources available (i. e. in an ideal case) 
while applying the method of historical source criticism. The assumption usually 
implicit in this procedure is well known: “somehow” the sources and historical real-
ity will correspond; the problem of representativeness and selectivity of sources is 
usually only superficially handled and then in a casuistic descriptive and not in a 
statistical manner. But even brilliant source criticism may lead to an insufficient 
treatment of sources in historical social research, characterized by a double prob-
lem: On the one hand, historical sources are often incomplete, i. e. only a segment 
is available; on the other hand, the historical social researcher might take a techni-
cally poor sample from those sources that are available. 
When historical sources pertaining to the question studied are incomplete or only 
a sample is available, the validity of further research depends on the researcher’s 
capacity to determine what type of “selection”, in relation to the “complete” body 
of non-accessible sources, the available sources represent. The question may also be 
put this way: which subset of objects from what total population do the sources 
constitute? Since there is often no adequate and certainly no quantifiable informa-
tion on the population, the historian must ascertain, how representative the sub-set 
of historical sources at his disposal actually is by considering the data available on 
the total population and by using the criteria of empirical theory already formulated. 
The further systematization and increasing precision (also statistical) of such deci-
sions still remains a major methodological concern of historical social research. In 
the application of sampling procedures to historical sources one can again draw 
upon the methods of empirical social research (although not to the historical social 
researcher’s complete satisfaction)39. Sampling is appropriate and, in the case of an 
                                                             
38  Cf. Harald Rohlinger, “Quellen als Auswahl—Auswahl aus Quellen,” in: Historical Social 
Research/Historische Sozialforschung 24 (1982), pp. 34-62; Paul J. Müller, “Improving 
Source Criticism to Cope with New Types of Sources and Old Ones Better,” in: ibid., pp. 
25-33; for practical application see Erdmann Weyrauch, “Datenverarbeitung als Quellenk-
ritik?” in: Paul J. Müller, ed., Die Analyse prozeßproduzierter Daten (Stuttgart, 1977), pp. 
141-198. 
39  Cf. et al., Ferdinand Böltken, Auswahlverfahren (Stuttgart, 1976); Gabriele Kaplitza, “Die 
Stichprobe,” in: Kurt Holm, ed., Die Befragung, Vol. 1 (Munich, 1975), pp. 136-186; Erwin 
K. Scheuch, “Auswahlverfahren in der Sozialforschung,” in: René König, ed., Handbuch 
der empirischen Sozialforschung, vol. 3a (Stuttgart, 1974), pp. 1-96; Manfred Sturm/Th. 
Vanja, “Planung und Durchführung von Zufallstichproben,” in: Jan van Koolwijk/Maria 
Wieken-Mayser, eds., Techniken der empirischen Sozialforschung, Vol. 6 (Munich, 1974), 
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abundance of sources, usually necessary when the total population may be precisely 
assessed. The degree of selection in the treatment of sources depends primarily on 
the necessity of economizing labor and resources, or on the subject studied. Despite 
some historians hankering for totality, it is often unnecessary and sometimes even 
damaging for the validity of empirical research to work through all accessible 
sources. 
In the next stept, the characteristics of the object to be investigated (units of 
analysis) are transformed into measurable variables. The construction of variables is 
a result of the operationalization of the terms already precisely defined. In this con-
text, “variables” are terminologically defined characteristics of objects having sev-
eral levels. Measurement is understood as the assignment of a set of numbers or 
symbols to the levels of a variable. This assignment must be systematic, i. e. all ob-
jects must be treated the same way and in accordance with the rules of assignment. 
This procedure is ordered according to the criteria of uniqueness (it is termed 
unique when every object can be ascribed to one level), exclusiveness (it is exclu-
sive when only one and not more than one level of a characteristic is appropriate) 
and completeness (it is complete when both criteria listed above are fulfilled for all 
objects). When these requirements are completely met, one speaks of a “classifica-
tion.” When these requirements are incompletely fulfilled, one speaks of a “typol-
ogy.” In this sense, a variable may also be defined as a set of values (levels) form-
ing a classification (or typology). 
In historical social research, measurement is often done according to nominal 
scale characteristics, i. e. the levels of a given variable have no substantially inter-
pretable order or other metric properties. For a long time, this meant that the statis-
tical processing of such data was restricted to simple descriptive procedures such as 
marginal distribution and cross-tabulation. The last few years, however, have seen 
the development of more sophisticated statistical procedures for the analysis of 
nominally scaled variables which—going beyond the analysis of twodimensional 
relations through measures of association—are capable of analyzing multivariate 
relations (e. g. on the basis of loglinear models)40. In connection with nominal vari-
ables, also termed qualitative variables, a misleading differentiation between “quali-
tative” and “quantitative” methods has arisen in historical discussion. Often, quanti-
fication is considered only in the narrow sense of the term, as the application of 
quantitative methods to metric variables. This narrow view corresponds to the typi-
cal use of quantification in German economic and social history, where source ma-
terial already in quantitative form is examined and evaluated. In contrast quantifica-
tion in historical social research is appropriate not only for metric variables but for 
non-metric variables as well. The criterion for differentiating between qualitative 
and quantitative methods is, therefore, not the measurement level of the variables 
                                                                                                                                
pp. 40-80; Jan van Koo1wijk, “Das Quotenverfahren: Paradigma sozialwissenschaftlicher 
Auswahlpraxis,” in: ibid., pp. 81-99; Roger S. Schofield, “Sampling in Historical Re-
search,” in: E.A. Wrig1ey, ed., Nineteenth-Century Society (Cambridge, 1972). 
40  For an introduction see Gerhard Arminger’s chapter on “Zusammenhänge zwischen nicht-
metrischen Variablen,” in: Konrad H. Jarausch et al., Quantitative Methoden in der Ge-
schichtswissenschaft. Eine Einführung in die Forschung, Datenverarbeitung und Statistik 
(Darmstadt, 1985), pp. 162-181 (with more far-reaching literature). 
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under scrutiny, but rather the level of theoretical orientation and formalization in 
the research operations used. 
Mathematical procedures are only meaningful when an elementary and funda-
mental requirement of research strategy is satisfied: The relations between the ob-
jects must be reflected by the relations between the numerical values. This precept 
on the validity of quantification has such prerequisites as the validity of term devel-
opment (the precise assignment of designates), indicator development (representa-
tive description of the cases characterized by a term) and of variable development 
(systematic assignment rules). Another important precept concerns the reliability of 
quantification which depends on three requirements that must be satisfied: in-
tertemporal stability (repeated measurement of the same phenomena bring the same 
results), intersubjective stability (different researchers using the same measuring 
devices on the same phenomena attain the same results) and inter-instrumental sta-
bility (the use of differing measuring devices on the same phenomena lead to the 
same results). 
The fifth step in a general research strategy consists of the analysis of the data. 
Statistics provide the methods for the aggregation, processing, and interpretation of 
numerical evidence. Statistics are an aid in consolidating, structuring, or grouping 
numerical data, and may also be put to illustrative purposes. Further, statistics put 
procedures at the researcher’s disposal which enable him to prove and evaluate hy-
potheses. In contrast to the field of qualitative procedures where the explanatory 
capacity of hypotheses remains vague, the application of statistical analysis delivers 
criteria which make it possible to prove the correctness and the range of the expla-
nations proposed. In statistics, one may differentiate between causal analysis (e. g. 
path-analysis) and those methods which reduce the existant complexity of informa-
tion to a few dimensions, as in the case of multidimensional scaling or factor analy-
sis41. The application of statistical models also invalues the precept of validity; cri-
teria for the adequacy of a statistical model for the question to be examined may not 
be drawn from statistics alone, but must be developed through the constitution of 
hypotheses and through operationalization. The choice of a particular statistical 
model is always made under the assumption that its conditions completely repro-
duce those of reality or—in the case of incomplete representation—that observable 
deviations from reality may still be tolerated without endangering the validity of the 
application. 
Quantification is not data-processing. One should not confuse a general method-
ology with an important research tool. The difference between “traditional” and 
more advanced applications of statistics is undoubtedly the latter’s routine use of e-
lectronic data-processing for the examination and analysis of data—a use which has 
greatly broadened the scope and the epistemological potential of quantification42. 
                                                             
41  For practical applications, see Hans H. Blotevogel, “Faktorenanalytische Untersuchungen 
der deutschen Großstädte nach der Berufszählung 1907,” in: Wilhelm H. Schröder, ed., 
Moderne Stadtgeschichte (Stuttgart, 1979), pp. 74-111; Heinrich J. Schwippe, “Faktoren-
analyse und Clusteranalyse. Möglichkeiten des Einsatzes multivariater Verfahren in der 
Analyse des Verhältnisses von Stadt und Land im östlichen Münsterland im frühen 19. 
Jahrhundert,” in: ibid., pp. 112-144. 
42  For data-processing see especially, Manfred Thaller, “Numerische Datenverarbeitung für 
Historiker,” (Wien, 1982); Konrad H. Jarausch et al., Quantitative Methoden, pp. 58-73 
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The five stages of a general research strategy outlined here must be transformed 
into directly applicable methods of investigation suited to the specific case under 
study. Inspite of the fact that empirical social research has already developed an 
arsenal of adequate and tested methods and has systematized them for use in re-
search and education, no text book, on Methods of Historical Social Research, as 
such has yet been written43. Although the development of genuinely valid methods 
or systematic procedures for historical social research has begun in many areas, 
only the first steps have been taken. When historical social research’s attempts at 
methodological development could adapt methods already existent in neighboring 
disciplines, progress has been relatively rapid. Such a methodological development 
within historical social research may be observed, e. g. in certain topics (stratifica-
tion and mobility research, historical demography...) for specific historical source 
groups (files, texts, parish registers, census manuscripts...), for particular types of 
data collecting (content analysis, retrospective interviews...) and for special analysis 
procedures (time series analysis, analysis of aggregated data, application of loglin-
ear models...)44. 
IV. Perspectives in historical social research in the Federal  
Republic of Germany 
When asking how successful historical social research has been in its attempt to 
broaden the scope of historical studies and to introduce a methodologically stricter 
concept of experience, it must not be forgotten that historical social research has 
been in existence in the Federal Republic of Germany for only about ten years as an 
approach encompassing a large number of researchers and the usual range of dis-
semination media45. This is a short time when set against the general time-span of 
large projects and the sluggish spread of scientific results. Nonetheless, the stan-
dardized examination of historical mass sources and the utilization of computers 
has become routine and has lost the exotic flavor it may oncel have had. Especially 
historical demography, history of the family, collective biography, and the history 
                                                                                                                                
(Author: Manfred Thaller); see also Manfred Thaller’s column, “Historical Software Sec-
tion,” in: Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung. 
43  In the meantime, German textbooks on quantitative history have also been published; see 
Konrad H. Jarausch et al., Quantitative Methoden; Dieter Ruloff, Historische Sozialfor-
schung. Einführung und Überblick (Stuttgart, 1985); Roderick Floud, Einführung in quanti-
tative Methoden für Historiker (Stuttgart, 1980), a sometimes inadequate translation of the 
2nd ed. of An Introduction to Quantitative Methods for Historians (London, 1979); Norbert 
Ohler, Quantitative Methoden für Historiker. Eine Einführung (Munich, 1980). 
44  A good survey of research in this area can be found in the periodical documentary volumes 
in the series, Historisch-Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungen, each of which contains ex-
tensive reports on research projects in the field of historical social research; cf. also Ruloff, 
Historische Sozialforschung, pp. 70-194. 
45  This beginning can be almost exactly dated to the year. 1975 when the association, QUAN-
TUM, was founded. QUANTUM launched the journal, Historical Social Research/Histo-
rische Sozialforschung (initially as a newsletter with the title, QUANTUM-Information), as 
well as the publication series, Historisch-Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungen. At the same 
time it created an academic audience for quantitative historical social research in the Fed-
eral Republic through a series of conferences and working conventions. 
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of voting behavior have reached a high standard and have made significant contri-
butions to contemporary discussions in sociology and history46. German quantita-
tive history today cannot be labelled, “backward”, anymore. 
Still, many contemporary observers show a scepticism and reservation regarding 
the gains of historical social research that cannot simply be explained by insinuating 
that an exotic novelty naturally loses its fascination47. On the contrary, many have 
only now come to realize that the use of quantification implies specific limitations. 
At first sight, the need for methodological self-discipline and asceticism in the face 
of speculative temptation might seem to be the greatest restriction. Even more con-
flicting, however, is the fact that microanalyses in which people are the study units 
are almost exclusively limited to research on institutionally defined roles and for-
mal structures. Quantifiable mass sources are typically the products of public book-
keeping which in its function and fact-gathering method is incapable of covering 
the informal world. Not only official secrets and matters left to personal discretion 
are badly recorded, but also, more generally speaking, the intent and motivation of 
human activity are left out. With the help of quantitative methods, we are quite ca-
pable of reconstructing the formal “structure of opportunity48” of past societies, as 
well as the way people behaved within this framework. But only rarely can a quan-
titative answer be given to the question of how people viewed the conditions under 
which they acted. One might expect that the use of systematic content analysis (a 
method too often neglected) might shed some light onto this darkness, but success 
remains limited: It cannot be forgotten that until the late 19th century the great mass 
of society was illiterate; the scope of the evidence for systematic content analysis, 
however, is limited to the literate elites. 
Comparative restrictions must also be accepted in research on a higher level of 
aggregation, i. e. when regional units or organisations are the units of observation. 
Typical data sources here are administrative statistics. But the goals of administra-
tive data-collecting do not necessarily coincide with the interests of present re-
searchers. It seems obvious that the study of questions not covered by immediate 
statistical evidence must be given up, but it is also understandable that the claim is 
very reluctantly waived. One way out of this dilemma is to choose methods of indi-
rect measurement and highly complex analysis procedures that attempt to examine 
the “unmeasured” through the use of mathematical operations on manifestly em-
pirical evidence. The application of such procedures is dependent on long chains of 
inference needing many pre-requisites. Here historical social researchers have 
sometimes skated on thin ice. The use of the “cattle-quota” as an indicator for the 
secondarization of national economies in the late 19th century49, or population 
growth as a substitute for missing data on the cross national product50 are examples 
                                                             
46  This is also documented by the (meanwhile) 21 volumes of Historisch-Sozialwissenschaftli-
chen Forschungen. 
47  Cf. et al. the section, “Qualitative Kritik“, in: Konrad H. Jarausch et al., op. dt., p. 195 ff. 
48  Cf. Talcott Parsons/Edward A. Shils, ed., Towards a General Theory of Action (New 
York), p. 225 f. 
49  Cf. et al. Richard H. Tilly, Sozialer Protest, p. 185. 
50  Paul B. Huber, “Regionale Expansion und Entleerung im Deutschland des 19. Jahrhunderts: 
Eine Folge der Eisenbahnentwicklung?” in: Rainer Fremdling/Richard H. Ti1ly, ed., Indu-
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of this tendency. The question is whether or not historical social research can meet 
its own demand of utilizing more valid evidence than “traditional” history while 
skirting the borderline of the measurable. At this point a descriptive casuistry would 
be more appropriate. This raises a more fundamental consideration: historical social 
research should complement philological historiography, but it is no substitute for 
it. If we allow the world beyond the data to turn into forbidden ground, our view of 
history will degenerate into a collection of disparate phenomena and events. How-
ever, this is not a carte blanche—quantitative methods do have greater evidential 
power than the hermeneutic circle. The maxim that, ceteris paribus, those proce-
dures should be used that offer the most reliable results, makes quantification with a 
good data base preferable. 
As far as the future potential of quantitative historical research is concerned, one 
may voice the optimistic prognosis that the scope of historical social research will 
be broadened in the next few years. Historical social research is profiting from 
technical innovations, e. g. the microcomputer which allows on the spot data-col-
lecting in archives, and the development of more efficient word processing which 
greatly reduces the time and financial costs of transforming texts into machine-
readable form. Efficient databank systems decrease the loss of information occuring 
through transformation of sources into data51. Therefore, the demand for theory-
guided research is rapidly loosing its technological foundation. New techniques of 
random sampling for complexly structured and/or damaged populations can now 
often reduce the survey effort without loss of information. Today historical source 
materials can be used which previously would have been considered too extensive, 
too complex in their content, or too oblique in their structure52. Progress and new 
possibilities may also be seen in the area of analysis procedures. For example, the 
methodological repertoire of network analysis can be successfully applied to the 
profusely documented historical data on interlocking positions and kinship pat-
terns53. New procedures in the multivariate analysis of event data represent efficient 
statistical instruments, especially suited to a science like history which considers 
events and development over long periods of time54. Problems in the adaption and 
transfer of the methods and research instruments do lead to bottlenecks. The most 
important future task of interdisciplinary historical social research is, however, pre-
cisely the solution of these problems. 
                                                                                                                                
strialisierung und Raum. Studien zur regionalen Differenzierung im Deutschland des 19. 
Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1979), p. 37 ff. 
51  Cf. Manfred Thaller’s column, “Historical Software-Section” (see ft. 42) in the journal, 
Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung and also, M. Thaller, “Automation 
on Parnassus. CLIO—A Databank oriented System for Historians,” in: Historical Social 
Research/Historische Sozialforschung 15 (1980), pp. 40-65. 
52  Cf. et al. Harald Rohlinger, „Quellen als Auswahl—Auswahl aus Quellen,“ in: Historical 
Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung 24 (1982), pp. 34-62. 
53  Cf. et al. The KZfSS’s special issue (1984) on the analysis of social networks. 
54  Cf. et al., Hans-Jürgen Andreß, Multivariate Analysen von Verlaufsdaten. Statistische 
Grundlagen und Anwendungsbeispiele für die dynamische Analyse nichtmetrischer Merk-
male (Mannheim, 1985); for an example of practical application: Heinrich Best, “Recon-
structing Political Biographies of the Past: Configurations, Sequences, Timing, and the Im-
pact of Historical Change,” in: Helene Millet et al., ed., Prosopographie et Informatique 
(Paris, 1985). 
